







































































compromise	 a	 patient’s	 best	 interests	 in	 order	 to	 promote	 other	 values,	 such	 as	 the	 health	 of	 family	
members	and	the	wider	public.[11,12]	Similarly,	many	would	hold	that	an	obstetrician	may	sometimes	
act	 to	protect	 a	 future	 child,	 even	 if	 this	 comes	 at	 some	 cost	 to	 the	patient—that	 is,	 the	prospective	
mother.[13]	It	can	be	argued	that	a	parallel	point	holds	in	relation	to	forensic	psychiatry:	professionals	in	
this	field	may	sometimes	give	precedence	to	values	besides	the	welfare	of	their	own	patients.[14]	Those	
who	hold	 that	 risk	 assessment	 tools	 should	 be	used	only	when	 they	benefit	 the	 patient	may	 thus	 be	
overstating	the	ethical	difficulties	created	by	such	tools.		
	
Nevertheless,	 the	 presence	 of	 competing	 values	 in	 risk	 assessment	 does	 create	 a	 potential	 ethical	
problem:	 it	 is	 possible	 that	 some	 values	 will	 be	 unjustifiably	 sacrificed	 for	 the	 sake	 of	 others.	 For	










Rates	 of	 false	 negatives	 are	 usually	 much	 lower.	 Nevertheless,	 in	 typical	 cases	 around	 9%	 of	 those	
classed	as	low	risk	will	go	on	to	offend.[18]	These	individuals	may	be	released	or	discharged	too	early,	
posing	excessive	 risk	 to	 the	public.	 Such	 failures	of	negative	prediction	are	 frequently	associated	with	
significant	controversy	and	outrage,	as	reactions	to	recent	high	profile	cases	demonstrate.[19]	
	
The	 prevalence	 of	 prediction	 errors	 does	 not	 entirely	 undermine	 the	 rationale	 for	 deploying	 risk	
assessment	 tools.	 To	 balance	 risk	 to	 the	 public	 against	 the	 interests	 of	 the	 assessed	 individual,	 some	
method	for	assessing	risk	is	required,	and	risk	assessment	tools,	even	if	limited	in	accuracy,	may	be	the	
best	option	available.	However,	to	mitigate	the	risk	of	inadequate	or	excessive	detention,	the	limitations	








far	 reported	 accuracy	 findings	 can	 be	 extrapolated	 to	 new	 settings	 and	 populations.[26,27]	 Second,	
there	is	strong	evidence	that	conflicts	of	interest	are	often	not	disclosed	in	this	field,	and	some	evidence	





Thus,	 not	 only	 is	 the	 predictive	 accuracy	 of	 risk	 assessment	 tools	 imperfect,	 it	 is	 also	 imperfectly	
presented	 in	 the	 literature.	The	 limited	and	skewed	evidence	base	creates	a	 risk	 that	decision	makers	
will	rely	more	heavily	on	risk	assessment	scores	than	their	accuracy	warrants.	To	mitigate	this	risk,	there	
is	a	need	for	better	quality	data	covering	more	subpopulations.	Validation	studies	should	include	more	




In	 addition	 to	 risking	 over-reliance	 on	 risk	 assessment	 scores,	 deficiencies	 in	 the	 evidence	 base	 also	
generate	 at	 least	 three	more	 specific	 problems,	which	we	 explain	 below:	 they	 (i)	 thwart	 attempts	 to	
match	 risk	 assessment	 tools	 to	 different	 contexts	 of	 application,	 (ii)	 complicate	 efforts	 to	 determine	
whether	 risk	 assessment	 tools	 are	 unjustifiably	 discriminatory	 or	 stigmatising,	 and	 thereby	 (iii)	




Selecting	 the	 optimal	 risk	 assessment	 tool	 for	 a	 given	 application	 requires	 trade-offs	 to	 be	 made	
between	 false	 negatives	 and	 false	 positives;	 attempts	 to	 reduce	 the	 number	 of	 false	 positives	 will	






on	the	social	and	political	context	 in	which	the	tool	 is	 to	be	used.[31]	For	example,	avoidance	of	 false	
positives	 may	 be	 more	 	 important	 in	 jurisdictions	 with	 less	 humane	 detention	 practices	 than	 in	




criminal	 justice	process	or	 patient	 pathway	 at	which	 the	 tool	will	 be	deployed.	 For	 instance,	 suppose	
that	a	risk	assessment	tool	is	used	to	inform	decisions	about	post-sentence	detention	in	a	setting	where
an	individual’s	initial	sentence	is	designed	to	be	proportionate	to	their	degree	of	responsibility	and	the	











Matching	 risk	 assessment	 tools	 to	 different	 contexts	 of	 application	 thus	 requires	 trade-offs	 between	
positive	and	negative	predictive	accuracy.	For	each	context,	we	must	first	decide	which	type	of	accuracy	
to	 prioritise	 to	 which	 degree,	 and	 then	 select	 a	 tool	 that	 reflects	 this	 priority.	 Unfortunately,	 in	 the	
absence	of	 reliable	data,	 it	 is	not	possible	 to	make	 the	 latter	decision	confidently.	There	 is	a	need	 for	
studies	using	representative	samples	for	relevant	subpopulations,	avoiding	highly	selected	samples,	and	






police	and	airport	 security.[33]	A	 similar	 concern	might	be	 raised	 regarding	 risk	assessment	 tools	 that	
take	into	account	an	individual’s	demographic	characteristics	such	as	ethnicity,	age,	immigration	status	
and	 gender.	 It	 has	 been	 suggested	 that	 risk	 assessment	 tools	 should	 employ	 only	 ‘individualised’	
information,	such	as	information	about	declared	plans	and	desires	based	on	face	to	face	interviews,[34,	
35]	 though,	 even	 then,	 judgments	 may	 be	 subject	 to	 implicit	 biases	 based	 on	 the	 demographic	
characteristics	of	the	individual	being	assessed.[36]	
	
However,	 the	 requirement	 to	 utilize	 only	 individualised	 information	 is	 overly	 restrictive.	 Some	would	
argue	 that	demographic	profiling	 is	discriminatory,	or	problematically	 so,	only	when	 the	demographic	
variables	 used	 are	 recognised	 social	 groups	 (such	 as	 ethnic	 or	 gender	 groups),[37]	 or	 certain	 kinds	of	
recognised	 social	 groups,	 for	 instance,	 those	 whose	 membership	 is	 unchosen,[38]	 or	 that	 have	




even	 if	 the	 problematic	 demographic	 variables	 are	 formally	 excluded	 from	 the	 analysis,	 they	 may	
continue	 to	 exert	 an	 influence;	 there	 remains	 the	 potential	 for	 implicit	 bias	 in	 the	 application	 of	 risk	






are	 indeed	more	 likely	 to	 offend,	 but	 only	 because	 they	 are	 victims	 of	 unjust	 social	 exclusion),	 if	 the	






enough.	The	parallel	with	 racial	profiling	 in	airport	 screening	 is	 instructive	here.	Airport	 screening	 is	a	
limited	 resource	 and	 there	 are	 reasons	 to	 deploy	 it	 to	 detect	 the	 maximum	 number	 of	 would-be	
terrorists.	 If	 profiling	 enables	 a	 far	 greater	 number	 of	 terrorist	 attacks	 to	 be	 prevented	 with	 the	
resources	 available	 than	 any	 other	 policy,	 and	 if	 the	 cost	 to	 those	 profiled	 is	 low,	 then	 it	 is	 arguably	








these	 predictors	 used,	 racial	 appearance	 would	 add	 no	 further	 predictive	 value.[43,44]	 In	 such	
circumstances,	use	of	racial	appearance	seems	unnecessary.		
	
Similarly,	 it	 may	 be	 problematic	 to	 use	 demographic	 predictors	 in	 risk	 assessment	 tools	 when	more	
specific	 predictors	 of	 future	 offending	 are	 available	 and	 these	 predictors	 would	 render	 the	 use	 of	
demographic	categories	redundant.			
	
Unfortunately,	 the	 lack	 of	 good	 evidence	 on	 accuracy	makes	 it	 difficult	 to	 ascertain	whether	 existing	
tools	 do	 use	 the	most	 specific	 predictors	 available.	 To	 determine	 this,	 we	would	 need	 to	 be	 able	 to	
compare	the	accuracy	of	more	specific	and	less	specific	tools	using	relevant,	reliable	and	unbiased	data	
on	 accuracy.	 Currently	 deployed	 tools	 frequently	 do	 use	 demographic	 factors	 such	 as	 age	 and	
immigration	 status	 as	 predictors,	 and	 although	 recent	 evidence	 suggests	 that	 including	 such	
demographic	factors	improves	predictive	accuracy,[45,46]	further	data	are	needed	to	confirm	this.	
	
In	 the	absence	of	 these	data,	 there	are	 two	 risks.	On	 the	one	hand,	mental	 health	professionals	may	
continue	 to	 employ	 coarse	 demographic	 variables	 that	 result	 in	 unnecessary	 discrimination	 or	
stigmatisation.	On	the	other,	given	growing	public	concern	regarding	 the	use	of	 such	variables,[47,48]	
professionals	 or	 policy	makers	may	prematurely	 remove	 them	 from	 risk	 assessment	 tools.[49]	 Before	






Thomas	 Douglas,	 Senior	 Research	 Fellow,	 Oxford	 Uehiro	 Centre	 for	 Practical	 Ethics,	 Faculty	 of	
Philosophy,	University	of	Oxford	and	Brasenose	College,	Oxford;	Jonathan	Pugh,	Postdoctoral	Research	
Fellow,	 Oxford	 Uehiro	 Centre	 for	 Practical	 Ethics;	 Ilina	 Singh,	 Professor	 of	 Neuroscience	 and	 Society,	
Department	of	Psychiatry,	University	of	Oxford,	Oxford	Uehiro	Centre	for	Practical	Ethics,	Oxford	Ethox	
Centre;	Julian	Savulescu,	Uehiro	Professor	of	Practical	Ethics,	Oxford	Uehiro	Centre	for	Practical	Ethics,	
Faculty	 of	 Philosophy,	 University	 of	 Oxford;	 Seena	 Fazel,	 Wellcome	 Trust	 Senior	 Research	 Fellow,	
Department	of	Psychiatry,	University	of	Oxford.	
	Correspondence:	 Seena	 Fazel,	 Department	 of	 Psychiatry,	 Medical	 Sciences	 Division,	 University	 of	
Oxford,	Warneford	Hospital,	Oxford,	OX3	7JX,	United	Kingdom.	Email:	seena.fazel@psych.ox.ac.uk	
	

















































































																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																																			
34	Nadelhoffer	T,	Bibas	S,	Grafton	S,	Kiehl	KA,	Mansfield	A,	Sinnott-Armstrong	W,	et	al.	“Neuroprediction,	
Violence,	and	the	Law:	Setting	the	Stage”	Neuroethics	2012;	5:	67–99.	
35	Shepherd	SM,	Sullivan	D,	“Covert	and	Implicit	Influences	on	the	Interpretation	of	Violence	Risk	
Instruments”,	Psychiatry,	Psychology	and	Law	2016;	doi:	10.1080/13218719.2016.1197817.	
36	Amodio	DM,	Devine	PG,	“Stereotyping	and	Evaluation	in	Implicit	Race	Bias:	Evidence	for	Independent	
Constructs	and	Unique	Effects	on	Behavior”,	Journal	of	Personality	and	Social	Psychology	2006;	91:	652–
61.	
37	Lippert-Rasmussen	K,	Born	Free	and	Equal?:	A	Philosophical	Inquiry	into	the	Nature	of	Discrimination	
(Oxford	University	Press,	2013)	at	p.	336.	
38	Kahlenberg	RD,	The	Remedy:	Class,	Race,	and	Affirmative	Action	(Basic	Books,	1997)	at	p.	386.	
39	Scanlon	T,	Moral	Dimensions:	Permissibility,	Meaning,	Blame	(Belknap	Press,	2008)	at	p.	247.	
40	Shepherd	SM,	“Violence	risk	instruments	may	be	culturally	unsafe	for	use	with	Indigenous	patients”,	
Australasian	Psychiatry	2016;	24:	565-567.	
41	Shepherd	SM,	Sullivan	D,	“Covert	and	Implicit	Influences	on	the	Interpretation	of	Violence	Risk	
Instruments”,	Psychiatry,	Psychology	and	Law	2016;	doi:	10.1080/13218719.2016.1197817.	
42	Shepherd	SM,	Lewis-Fernandez	R,	“Forensic	Risk	Assessment	and	Cultural	Diversity	–	Contemporary	
Challenges	and	Future	Directions”,	Psychology,	Public	Policy	and	Law	2016;	22:	427-438.	
43	Lippert-Rasmussen	K,	“Nothing	Personal:	On	Statistical	Discrimination”,	Journal	of	Political	Philosophy	
2007;	15:	385–403.	
44	Lippert-Rasmussen	K,	““We	are	all	Different”:	Statistical	Discrimination	and	the	Right	to	be	Treated	as	
an	Individual”,	Journal	of	Ethics	2010;	15:	47-59.	
45	Fazel	S,	Chang	Z,	Fanshawe	T,	Långström	N,	Lichtenstein	P,	Larsson	H,	Mallett	S,	“Prediction	of	Violent	
Reoffending	on	Release	from	Prison:	Derivation	and	External	Validation	of	a	Scalable	Tool”,	The	Lancet	
Psychiatry	2016;	3(6):	535-543.	
46	Skeem	JL,	Lowenkamp	CT,	“Risk,	Race,	and	Recidivism:	Predictive	Bias	and	Disparate	Impact”,	Social	
Science	Research	Network	2016;	doi:	http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2687339.	
47	Angwin	J,	Larson	J,	Mattu	S,	Kirchner	L,	“Machine	Bias:	There’s	Software	Used	Across	the	Country	to	
Predict	Future	Criminals.	And	It’s	Biased	Against	Blacks”,	ProPublica	2016,	
https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing.	Accessed	on	
02/12/16.	
48	Barry-Jester	AM,	Casselman	B,	Goldstein	D,	“Should	Prison	Sentences	Be	Based	on	Crimes	that	Haven’t	
Been	Committed	Yet?”,	FiveThirtyEight	2015,	http://fivethirtyeight.com/features/prison-reform-risk-
assessment/.	Accessed	on	02/12/16.	
49	Monahan	J,	Skeem	JL,	“Risk	Assessment	in	Criminal	Sentencing”,	Annual	Review	of	Clinical	Psychology	
2016;	12:	489–513.	
